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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
OREM CITY, a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DEE PYNE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 10211 
DEFENDANT ·RESP-ENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Respondent was charged with the crime of 
a misdemeanor in the Orem City ·Court for failing to pay 
a license tax to Orem City for a retail sales used automo-
bile business operated by him in Orem, Utml. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the Orem City Court the Defendant-Respondent 
was convicted and thereafter appealed his conviction to 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and fur Utah COunty, 
claiming that the license ordinance under whose pocview 
he was convicted was void as to him. 
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2 
The Defendant-Respondent being entitled to a trial 
de novo entered a plea m "Not GUilty", but stipulated that 
during the fuhe since the oJ;dinance h;ad .purportedly been 
in effect he had conducted a used car bu_siness within o~rem 
City and made sales :;o[ used cars which were subject to 
the Utah State Retail Sales '!!ax and had not paid any Orem 
City license tax. 
Orem City Ordinance · No. · 26, paSSed by· ··the City 
Council of Orem City, May 22, 1961, ·and published in the 
I . ' ~ . 
OTein-Geneva Times on June 1, 1961, a.·newspaper of gen-
. eral .Circulation in· Orem City, was introduced ill.,.evidence 
by stipulation of the. p~i~,~ .'.;The Defendant~.Resp(mdenf 
moved the Court for ··al.s~sai ·Of -.rthe complaint solely on 
the ground that the o:r~W1£e was invalid in imposing ·any 
t;a.x. on tlle Defendant's used car business on the basis. that 
the· oro.mance was· unreasonable; arbitrary, and- discrimi-
natory in ·tts application to the Defendant-Respondent's 
business. 
~.:'File· Fourth Judicial :,DiStrict. COUrt .-or·-:utah, /fu and 
~., U:Ulh Cour:to/·t: o~ date ;of. Attgust 3, 1964, on the ·~ounds 
that., .. the ordinance. was unreasonable,- arbitrazy, and dis-
.. ;_ ·., '· . . ' ' . . - ·,, ··-·.· .. .. 
~tory granted, the motion ~or dismissal and entered .an 
6~· ~- Dism~~·ln ae<Xlrdance .the~ewith. - .. ·.. . 
- RELIEF SOUGHT· ON: APPEAL 
·The t>efendant~Respondent · ih this appeal requests the 
Court for an O~rder affirming the -Order of Dismissal of 
the.·:Foorth District Court and further that it·hold and de-
- ·clam··Orem City Ordinanee· No. 26 null, void,' and uncort-
$1iturti<:mal as it applies· to Defendant-ReSpOndent. 
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3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no record of any evidence other than the 
stipulation by the parties that the Defendant-Respondent 
during the time since the Oroinance purportedly went in-
to effect conducted a retail used car sales business within 
Orem City and made sales subject to the sales tax imposed 
by the State of Utah on retail sales, and had not paid any 
Orem City license tax. 
Orem City 0Tdinance No. 26 was introduced in evi-
dence by stipulation of the parties; Section 3 of said· ordi-
nance imposes a license fee as follows: 
SECTIO·N #3. Any: individual, firm, co-partner-
ship, joint venture, co~ration, estate or trust or any 
group or combination acting as a unit, the plural as 
well as the singular, engaged in business of manufac-
turing of any tangible, personal property and selling 
the same at retail in 0Tem City; or of selling any tan-
gible personal property at either retail or wholessale, 
or both in Orem City shall pay to Orern City an annual 
license fee of 1/10 of 1% of the gross sales made, that 
are also subject to the State of Utah Sales Tax, btit 
the minimum license fee shall be $6.25 per quarter and 
the maximum license fee shall be $75.00 per quarter 
payable quarterly . . . . • • • • 
SECTION #1 of this same Ordinance, however, lists 
201 purported businesses subject to this ordinance also and 
excludes the operation of Section #3 upon some of them 
by establishing a flat rate of $25.00 per annum despite 
the fact that they too sell tangible personal property at 
either retail or wholsale, such sales being also subject to 
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the State of Utah·. retail sales tax~ where the sale is in effect 
on :a retail basis. 
Section #l does not name specifically· the Defendant-
Respondent~s type of business. and· if his business~ is cov-
ered at all, it is by Section #3-. 
·RESPONDENT'S POINT 
THE CO·URT RULED CO·RRECTLY TH1AT THE OR-
DINAN~CE WAS .UNRE'A:.SONABLE; -ARBITRARY,· AND 
DISCRIMINATORY IN Its· -APJ;>LICATION TO DE-
FENDANT-RES.PO·NIDENT'S BUSINES·S IN GRANTING 
ITS ORDE!R O,F DISMISSAL AND THEREFORE 
SHOqLp ,BE. AFFIRMED .. 
' ·: ·.__- ~ ARGUMENT 
... ·, 
, -~'. ipefe~nt:,Respondent does. not. dispute Orem 
City'_s;·a~thority _to impose a liCense tax on businesses with-
~-· its · corporate lirriit~;:. to raise revenue. Section· lQ-8-80 
~:~-the: Utah -~de- Annotated, 1953 c~ers such rights on 
q~eS and T9wns in Utah, . but with the _qualification· . . . 
"AI.l such license fees ·and taxes· shall he uriifrom 
· ..... :in ·x:espeet to the class upon which they ate imposed.'' 
Pursuant to this Statute, the City of Orem enacted its 
OrdiOOnce·No. 26, prOviding in section 3 a tax;of:l/lO.of 1% 
On \the gross sales of~ bUsinesses in orem City engaged; iii 
selling tangible· personaf ·property where such sales were 
sUJbject to the Utah State Reta.il Sales Ta.X, with a mini· 
muin Of $6.25 per quarter. year and a maximum of. $75JJO 
ftor· the same period. 
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5 
If the Defendant-Respondent's business is covered at 
all, it is covered by this general section and not by any 
other specific provision of the ordinance. Further, if O·rem 
City's Ordinance No. 26 contained only this general pro-
vision for the licensing of anyone engaged in selling tan-
gible personal property subject to Utah State Rertail Sales 
Tax, and no more, it would certainly comply with the stat-
utory requirement of unifornrlty set forth in Section 10-
8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 19'53. Unfortunately, how-
ever, it sets about to enumerate more than 200 specific busi-
nesses and professions, disregarding the requirement of 
uniformity and arbitrarily levying a license fee for some 
on the basis of Section 3, and others on a straight annual 
fee of $2'5.00 regardless of their volume of gross sales, even 
though such sales are subject to the Utah State Retail Sales 
Tax law. 
The \Defendant-Respondent is aware and admits that 
the law presumes that an ordinance is valid until the con-
trary is shown. However, city licensing ordinances enacted 
for rta.x puvposes must be stri.ctly construed, and in cases 
of reasonable doubt, the construction should be against the 
government. Miller v. Standard Nut Margerine Co., 284 
U~- 498, 52 S Ot 2HO, 263, 76 L Ed 422. Appeal of School 
District of City of Allentown (1952) 370 Pa 161, 87 A. 2D 
480. 
The principal claim of the Defendant-Respondent is 
that the ordinance in question is discriminatory, arbitrary 
and unreasonable and contravenes the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States of America, 
depriving this person of his property, without due process 
of law and further denying him rthe equal protection of 
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the laws, which is also guaranteed him by Article 1, ·• Sec-
tion 2 of the Utah State Constitution: 
''All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for 
their equal pvotection and benefit . . . . '' 
In Matthews v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P 303, at page 
22.7 of the Utah Reports, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
"Neiither the constitution nor the statute author-
izes· . . . . ordinances . . . . to tax -citizens arbitra.ril.J 
· and. unustly, by li-cense which confers no privilege that 
was_ not pr-eviously enjoyed, and which has no view to 
regulation. Unjust _and illegal discrimination between 
Persons, in taxat~on, and ~he denial of equal justice, 
. are within the prohibitions of the constitution of this 
··state, ·and of the ,:United· States/' ·· 
.. , Further ~the Court said: 
' . J J '• • : • • • •• • ·:.. • ... '· • : • ~. • ... ~:: 
~>:~ -~ · ''The.law·abhors inequality and lack of unifonnity 
,~;.;J. .Jn ··T.axation· whether the burden be imposed by license 
,'(: . ·<~;~r .. _ by levy. and assessment." 
_t:.,;· ·As· to·: what constitutes illegal and unjust discrimma-
. . 
tibn in· taxation, our Supreme Court of Utah has ·held in 
the case· of Slater v.-Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206.P·2d 
153:_/;;.: 
"Discrimination is the essence of classification and 
does violen·ce to the -constitution only when the basis 
upon whieh it is founded is unreasonable. In fix~ 
the limits of the class, the legislative body has a wide 
discretion and this court may not concern itself with 
the wisdom or policy of the law. Our function is to 
determine whether an enactment ope~rates equally upon 
all persons similarly situated. If it does then the dis-
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7 
crimination · is within permissible legislative limits. If 
it does. nort, then the discrimination would be without 
reasonable basis and the act does not meet the test m 
constitutionality.'' 
Continuing,· the Court declared: 
"This Court !has repeatedly passed on municipal 
ordinances and has invalidated rthem when there has 
been unreasomble discrimination.· Just so long as 
City Commissioners insist on writing unwarranted ex..: 
-emptions into ordinances must the enactment ~ail. 
· . Elquality of treatment of classes similarly situated mus.t 
be -~aintain~. And even though an exemprti~ granteq 
may -be temporary, a preference extended fp[" .a short 
pffiiod of time undermines the foundation upon which 
equal IJrotectioo .of the ·law is premised.'' 
From this case, which was also the precedent_ ~or de-
·; I:_ .,.. • • . . • ' 
ciding _the Davis case, Davis vs. O:gden City, 2~~ ~ac .2.d~. 
616, we then have the test that Utah ~has adop~ed to esmb-
.·. ... . ' ,·_· .. .-• .... 
lish the validity of O·rdinances or to .strike .them .:down: 
Docs ~he enactment in question operate equally . upon 
all ~rsons similarly. situated? 
In the Davis· case the Court upheld Ogden City's or-
dinance imposing a license fee on every business and prO.:. 
fession· in Ogden, Utah, based on a percentage· of· gross re-
ceipts and rightfully· so since ·its application was uniform 
for .all·in Ogden engaged in business, whether it be of sel-
. ling goods or rendering servi~ces professionally or orther-
wise so long as the person was in business orr self-·employed. 
Here then we have reached ·the issue whieh divides 
the respective parties to this action. Just what is meant 
by· "Persons similarly situated?" The Plaintiff-Appellant 
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contends that it means pe·rsons selling the same identical 
product or engaged in the same identical service. All used 
car· dealers, all book ·stores, all soft drink sales agencies, all 
lumber yards and so on ad infinitum would be persons sim-
ilarly situated and them alone. The Appellant refuses to 
accept that the seller of used cars is similarly situated as 
the seller of heavy ·farm machinery; that the seller of books 
is similarly situated as the sener of magazines; that the 
seller of hot dogs is similarly situated as the seller of ice 
cream. Appellant contends that the city can establish a 
separate class for every seller of a known product, and that 
when new products come upon the market, using the same 
logic, there will have to be a new class established for that 
particular seller of that product. This type of classifica-
tion is certainly unreasonable. 
It is the position of the Defendant-Respondent that the 
seller of used cars is in fact in every sense of the term (ex-
cept fo~ product) in a similar situation as the seller of. 
appliances, meat, fann implements, oriental goods, auto 
parts, magazines and soft water machines. All of the 
aforementioned products when sold are amenable to the 
Utah S:tate Retail Sales Tax law, and are in every sense 
of the term tangible property, and sellers of these products 
should be taxed by Orem City on the same basis as pro• 
vided in Section 3 of the ordinance in question .. 
Plaintiff -Appellant contends that Defendant-Respond-
ent should pay a Hcense· tax of up to $300.00 per year as an 
annual license tax to do business in Orem City. However, 
the sellers of the other products mentioned in the preced-
ing paxagraph, because they are put in a class, all by them-
selves, should only lbe required to pay an annual license fee 
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or tax, of $25~00 · reg~ess. of; the: amount of. g:ross sale&· 
they make of· their particular product during the- calendar 
year. And the only Justification given f~ this. action i£. 
that. the o~rem City has or is supposed to have an unques-
tioned .. rignt of· classification of., business. in its territori~al 
jurisdiction, and: that once the iron clad classification 1has. 
been made, there is no opportunity to even consult with 
the. city. officials if a particular business man is not in. a£-· 
cord with this rigid classification. The ordinance in, ques-. 
tio~1 has no provision .~or any adjustment, hec¢ng, or even 
interview- ~th. any city official ergarding_ the arbitrary 
classification .. and. establishment ·of tax. 
Mr. Justice Wolf, in. concurring· in the Slater·. case.t 
above. cited,. declared: 
"Always the classificatiOfll must be reviewed and 
viewed in the light of the· purposes. of the. legislation. 
And if we can conceive of any exigeney or· exigencies 
which could reasonably be met''b.Y the/ prohibition we 
. must assume- that the legislation. was passed for those 
purposes and: test the constitutionality of. the act ac-
cordingly.'' 
Now..~the purpose of this ordinance is. to raise reven~ 
only, and hence the classification must be viewed or re.-
vieewd in- light of this purpose and not to prombit the com-
mencement or carrying. on . of a particWar business as is 
the case;· in most of the cases cited in. Plaintiff .. Appellant's 
brief. 
In the case, of· Bradmy vs. Richmond, 22.7 u.s 477, 57 
L eeL 603, 33; SC p 318; Sedalia. ex rei. Bauman vs. Standard 
Oil Company, 66 Fed. 2d- 757, 95 ALR 1514; and City. of 
St ~barles vs. Schulte, 305. Mo .. 124,. 264 SW 6.54, all cited 
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10. 
by Plaintiff-Appellant, the classes established by the vari-
ous legislative bodies in these cases were definite; standards 
were established which ·clearly distinguished one class from 
another. However the purpose of these ordinances were 
to regul~ate banking, the sale of gasoline, and soft drinks. 
Orem City Ordinance No. 26, however, seeks not to regu-
late anything. Its only ·purpose is to radse revenue, and 
the only basis of classification used is· the difference of pro .. 
duct sold. 
The cases cited in the preceding paragraph are the 
basis of· the legal text of Classification contained in Ameri-
can Jurisprudence Volume 38, page 32, under the title of 
Municipal C<FpOCations, section 343 reads: 
"The gene~ral rule, so far as. classification of busi-
ness for the purpose of municipal license or occupation 
. taxation is concerned is that trades, occupations, pro-
. fessions and privileges may be ·classified for the pur-
pose of license or occupation taxation, and different 
licenses may be imposed upon the various classes, pro-
vided the classification is reasonable". 
Defendant-Respondent submits that a classification 
baSed on the kind of product sold only is certainly unrea-
sOnable. 
To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a reason-
able classification of businesses generally for taxation and 
fix ·a tax rate therefor· based on gross sales with certain 
minimum and maximum amounts, and by another section 
of the same ordinance exclude from the operation of Sec-
tion 3, certain businesses naturally falling within its classi-
fication, and apply to such excluded businesses a tax rate 
on a flat annual basis that can not possibly be more than 
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11-
the mHllmatn-: for· the ~un~elooed businesses is unr'ea8onable, 
arbitrary, and discriminatory~ Such exclusion assures to; 
the excluded ~messes a concession ~not aceOrded to othe·r 
businesses smillarly situated. 
This. is in . keeping with the decision O!f ·the Utah Su-
preme .Court in. the case of State vs. Masoo, 78 Bac 2d, 920 
. . . . . ~ . . . ' . ' -. 
in upholding a Utah State .Statute req·uiring ptwchasers of. 
._ . . 
~arm products from farmers, other .fuan for oash, to obtain 
a. -Utah State License in order to ·protect fue farmers from 
selliflg their c~ops to someone nort finapcially re~ix)nsible. 
.. . . . ' . . - ~ 
"A denial of the law's equal protection -presup]lo8es 
an lJIU"easonable discrimination between those included 
and . thase excluded from the act. whether th~ act con• 
fers a- privilege or a right or imposes a duty or an ob-
ligation .... 
. A classification is never unreasonable or arbi:tmry 
in its inclusion pr exclusion features so long . as there 
is some basis for the differentiation between cl~ or 
subject martters included as compafed to those eX:.. 
. eluded' from its operation, provided the differen.tfu.tion 
·bears a reasonable relatiOn to the· purpose· to be·· ac-
complished by the act . . . . 
. . . ';l:he objeCts and ptwpases. of· a law present t~e 
· touch stones for determining the proper and improper 
classification." . · ... 
"It is- only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from the operation of the law are as to the 
sUbject matter of the law in no differentiable class from 
those included in its operation that the law is· dis-
. criminatory-in the sense of being arbitrary and unCOill-
....;+;+.~ ...... """""_, ,, ' ~WLUILlU.&.ICU, 
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12 
Certainly, ~those buSinesses specifically classified by 
themselves by the Orem ordinance in section 1 of the en-
a~ent and exempted from the operation of the levy of 
1/10 of 1% of the gross sales as provided in· Section 3, and 
given ;fJhe flat $25.00 tax per annum render 1Jhis said Onli-
nance No. 26 of Orem arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
This same holding is supported by another Utah Case, 
that of Broadbent vs. Gibson, 140 Pac 2d, 939. 
Plaintiff-Appellant admits, "Fundamentally, the Orem 
City ordinance has two levys"-one at the rate of $25.00 
and one at -one-tenth of 1% of the gross sales. Now how 
can there be an equal application of the law here to per-
sons similarly situated when there is a dual standard of 
levy and it rests with the City Council to say what or which 
Of the levies should be applied to a certain person or busi-
ness placed in a fixed class also at the whim of the coun-
cil? -Especially where those on a percentage of gross sales 
le\TY'must· pay up to $300.00 or twelve times the amount 
of the $25.00 class. 
Finally, and in referenc to Orem's dual standard of 
levy it must be remembered that the Statute, Section 10-
8-80 of the Uah Code Annotated, 1953, requires that the 
li~cense fre.s and taxes shall be "Uniform" in respect to the 
class upon which they are imposed. The term Uniform 
means liteTally "one form" which is applicable to all con-
cerned; yet the Orem ordinance 1has admittedly not one 
but two· forms of levy which are applied to persons selling 
tangi!ble personal property subject to the Utah State Re-
tail Sales Tax law. 
The Defendant-Respondent, in answering Plaintiff-Ap-
pellant's argument that it is extremely difficult, if not im-
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13_ 
possible, to devise a tax system \Vhich is. equitable .to all, 
' ' '·· ' .. . 
respectfully calls th~ Court's attention to the ordinance. 
of Ogden City which was reviewed in the Davis case .and 
which was upheld by this Court because it was uniform 
and operated equally upon all persons similarly situated, . 
based on a percentage of gross .receipts. Salt Lake City 
has adopted the other avenue of a base of $25-.00 per busi-
ness--plus $2.00 per employee, which also. is uniform and 
complies with the Statute. . Orem City could adopt either 
of these two plans. It cannot have both and arbitrarily, 
apply first one and then the other to merchants on a hit 
and miss checker board fashion and still comply with the 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant-Respondent respectfully contends that 
the lower Court's Order dismissing the complaint against 
him by the Plaintiff-Appellant and holding the Orern Or-
dinance No. 2.6 void as it applied to him was COITeCt, and 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK H. BU'ITERFIELD 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
439 South State, 
Orem,Utah 
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